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Blog Editor
In a previous post, we addressed that the recent massive expansion of online services and
mobile applications puts pressure on EU’s traditional telecoms to reassess their business
structures.  Silvia Elaluf-Calderwood and Jonathan Liebenau reflect on the importance of a
well-functioning single European telecoms market but warn about the implications that subsidiary
policies may have in the region. 
In a recent Op-Ed piece in the Wall Street Journal, David Cantor  called for changes in practices
that would bring about a single European telecoms market. He points out that the efforts to use principles of subsidiary to
balance competition with integration since 1998 have failed and that the consequence has been a loss of competitive edge.  In
what he presents as a dramatic plea for a shake up in the current industry structure, he suggests that a solution will be found in
the creation of a couple of pan-European backbone operators.
We at LSE Tech, and colleagues who have worked with us have been
conducting research over the past few years that address elements of this
argument.  In an article for First Monday, Panayiota Tsatsou extends work she
conducted with two of us some years ago (Tsatsou et al., 2009) to argue that
European Union normative practices legitimized government intervention in
the communications market for social purposes and allowed continued public
monopoly over radio and broadcasting to continue past 1998.  However, the
emerging communications policy could be dealt with in a way that is
consistent with principles of subsidiarity and also utilizing mediating
mechanisms of the EU to stimulate NRA independence and to monitor
decision–making procedures of cooperation between NRAs, member states
and the EU. Mediating mechanisms, as Tsatsou argues, can address the
“principal–agent” relation and put “accountability instruments in centre
position”, allowing “national regulatory authorities (NRAs) to use their
discretion intelligibly and reasonably”. This can facilitate the empowerment of NRAs and their discretion, making at the same
time NRAs more accountable.  One presumed advantage of this, expressed by Brunekreeft and Meyer (2011), is that a
different focus on QoS, in particular with regard to tiering, is likely to foster more investment. This could be seen as a means of
respecting both the peculiarities of national markets and the opportunities afforded by different business models. Various other
perspectives have emerged from research in this area.  Martin Cave (2009) argues that the early success of the post-1998
reforms was based on regulation excising retail price controls, universe service obligations, and access pricing restrictions. In a
previous  blog we have looked to the issues of net neutrality and regulation. However, our work (Liebenau et al. 2011 and
Liebenau et al 2012) and that of some others identify underlying problems associated with the need to fund significant
investment in new network infrastructure (Kramer and Wiewiorra, 2012).
Recent framing of the problem has presented net neutrality and the industry ability to compete with non-European rivals as
exchangeable positions.  This is something we have discussed in a previous blog where we referred to research that takes
different perspectives to net neutrality in Europe and USA.  We have also raised the problem of how regulators deal with
European legal, social and regulatory heterogeneity.  From our perspective, it is misleading to regard net neutrality and
competition as exchangeable and the argument distracts from understanding of the core problems of the industry.
The paradox of the European telecommunications industry is that while trying to keep its “social” norms and its “competitive”
edge in equilibrium, it has weakened its own ability to innovate and compete.  This has effectively ceded the lead to US
counterparts whose network business models increasingly are adapted to new revenue schemes and integrated, modular
strategies.  Cantor and others argue that it is futile to try to reform existing telecoms regulatory frameworks within the policy of
subsidiary and implies that it will not address issues such as what to do with the VoIP business or investment in new networks.
Based on a range of perspectives from journalists, business analysts, economists and our own academic research, there is an
urgent need to break away from the 1990s ideals of subsidiary and the resultant institutions of regulation and business
practice.  Only when the realities of network architecture, utilization and business models become the basis for the operation of
the infrastructure will innovation and investment return to the European telecommunications sector.  Cantor is not wrong to
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stress the need for a functioning single European telecoms market, but he is not going to get it by neglecting the realities, as
well as the ideals, that underpinned subsidiarity and its recognition of the heterogeneity of markets.
This article gives the views of the authors, and not the position of the London School of Economics.
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